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This book on the theory of literary criticism is at once radical and traditional,
bold and academic. It begins with a concept of the function of criticism that
recalls Aristode's aim to build up some rational order in the realm of art. Mr.
Frye boldly rejects interpreting and evaluating particular works as a primary
aim of criticism; this aim seems to him not only endless but futile because it
merely reflects changes in the history of taste, instead of building up a body of
coherent fact about literature. His view of criticism as an autonomous field of
knowledge leads him to treat the most hlghly regarded critics in the English
tradition as mere good readers, not" genuine critics." A critic like Arnold only
"represents the reading public at its most expert and judicious" (p. 8). The
genuine critics are the literary students of all kinds who make permanent contributions to our Imowledge. His complaint about literary scholarship is only
that it has stopped short of its potentialities. He revives the hope of a few generations ago that literary criticism may develop much farther than it has done as a
science. He willingly gives up the conscious evaluative function of criticism;
and yet he believes that literary criticism establishes the canon of the tradition
and the content of literary education without conscious evaluation of particular
works.
Mr. Frye thinks of the critic's function as the systematic study of literature
as a whole, of seeing each work only as a part of that" total order." He accepts
as profoundly true and as a germinating critical idea the suggestion of T. S. Eliot
that the existing monuments of literature form an ideal order among themselves,
and he attempts throughout his book to describe this order. He seems to think
of it not as being constandy modified by new works, as Eliot did, but as a fixed
order which new works only make manifest in different ways. .Mr. Frye seems
academic in his rejection of any such aim as II to correct taste" or to influence
the future course of literature. His ideal critic II describes and co-ordinates," and
unlike most practicing poets who have been critics his critic progresses toward
great catholicity of taste based rather upon lmowledge and understanding than
upon personal likes and dislikes. These ideas suggest why Mr. Frye calls his
introduction "polemical," but his attitude to all criticism, as to all literature, is
catholic.
He would accept all kinds as useful, and in his four substantive chapters
(modestly called "essays") he attempts to see four different kinds of criticism
in perspective, from his own point of view. He describes first the historical
U modes"
which he defines; then the kind of criticism which interprets and
evaluates symbols; third, archetypal forms of imagery and narrative; and finally,
U rhetorical
criticism"-the treatment of the verbal surface of literature. His
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own approach leads him to the principal questions of literary theory. His method
in each chapter is to take a broad view of the whole body of literature, to make
broad discriminations, and to order and classify what he sees. Illustrative refer~
ences are plentiful, and often very suggestive, but particular works are seen only
as from a distance, and particulars are deliberately overlooked. Mr. Frye, like
a draughtsman sketching from nature, seems to half close his eye in order to see
the main outlines more clearly. It is these alone that he wants to see .
.Mr. Frye is explicit in not rejecting any approaches to literature, and he tries
rather to open the way for fruitful exchange and cooperation between various
kinds of literary students. Yet his concept of the function of criticism seems
inevitably to throw a special emphasis on what he calls "archetypal criticism,"
and the third essay, with this title, seems the most richly suggestive in the book.
Archetypal criticism, as he describes it, studies the forms which are repeatedly
embodied in literature as patterns of imagery or narrative. In his view, the literary
structures which continually and significantly elicit our deepest responses are
best studied in the archetypal myths. And these myths are present, though seemingly "displaced," even in sophisticated literary works. Archetypal criticism,
which Mr. Frye recommends especially (p. 104), would involve careful and objective comparisons of literary works in all times and places in the way that traditional ballad forms, for example, have been traced and studied. He describes
five categories of archetypal images and four categories of narrative. The first
range from "images of the highest human aspiration" and desire to "images of
all that desire rejects." Mr. Frye's classification and description is intensely interesting, but he admits (p. 158) that in a particular work the archetypal images
may be only" latent" and that this latent meaning, though "one factor," is not
the "real content" of the work. The archetypes are presumably of paramount
importance not for the interpretation of a literary work, but for understanding
"literature as a whole," and for explaining the appeal of particular works.
The treatment of archetypal narratives-tragic, comic, romantic, ironic-is again
impressive, and perhaps more suggestive for concrete analysis than the descriptions
of archetypal symbols. Tragedy, for example, is discriminated from comedy as
a story of the hero's alienation from his society; comedy being a story of his
integration. Without rejecting the insights of Aristotle, Mr. Frye follows a
Christian tradition in considering Adam's fall as the archetype of tragedy. His
fall led to a loss of freedom, and Mr. Frye treats this as the characteristic theme
of all tragedy. Christian tragedy is possible, he would say, because the Christian
view of life includes the tragic, though it does not stop with it. He treats the
quest-theme as characteristic of the romance narrative, which includes, like the
Christian epic, both tragedy and comedy. These general discriminations are
extremely interesting and suggestive for the analytical study of particular works.
But their value and truth perhaps cannot be known until they have been so
tested and applied. In simplifying the stru~tures of particular works for his
classifications, Mr. Frye seems to assume that what creates the powerful response
of the reader and audience is not the rich, complex, and unique qualities of a
work of art, but the underlying structure beneath this complexity, a structure
which it shares with innumerable other works. He seems to suggest that the
most important part of meaning is understood subconsciously. It is clear that
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his thought is indebted not only to Aristotle but to modern anthropologists and
psychologists, especially Jung.
Mr. Frye defines "ethical criticism" as the "study of the literature of the
past with a view to its value in the present," and it is in this criticism that the
critic is concerned primarily with meaning and value. It seems characteristic
that he relegates these aspects of criticism, theoretically at least, to only one
of his four essays. And the most interesting part of this essay, again significandy
for his approach, is the "Mythical Phase: Symbol as Archetype," a level of
meaning in which the work is seen as a myth which II unites ritual and dream."
In this essay Frye treats literary convention and originality. Like Eliot he stresses
the impersonality of the artist, but he seems to go further than reason suggests
in belittling the importance of the artist's personality and experience. Poems
are made out of other poems, he would say, and the II new poem manifests something that was already latent in the order of words" (p. 97). The poet, the
producer of culture, is thought of principally as a master of technique, and an
important part of his product is unconscious (all technique "is a habitual, and
therefore an increasingly unconscious, sldll" [po 88]). In a similar way, Frye
later writes, II while the production of culture may be, like ritual, a half-involuntary
imitation of organic rhythms or processes, the response to culture is, like myth, a
revolutionary act of consciousness" (p. 344). In culture the role of the artist
is made to seem subordinate to the role of the critic. The" true father" of the
poem is not the poet but the "form of the poem itself . . . a manifestation of
the universal spirit of poetry" (p. 98). And it is only the critic that determines
what are works of art.
The "order of words" seems to have for Mr. Frye an existence in an ideal
realm, beyond its existence in speech and literature. Though most of his book
is concerned with the definition, classification, and description of literary phenomena as he finds them, he is led to postulate some "total form," fixed and
unmoving, beyond the concrete manifestation. It is like the Prime Mover in
Aristotle's concept of physical nature. In his conclusion, admittedly speculative
and tentative, Mr. Frye thinks of literature as II an autonomous language . . .
in a measure independent of that common field of experience which we call
the objective world, or nature, or existence, or reality" (p. 350). "In reading
a novel we have to go from literature as reflection of life to literature as autonomous language" (p. 351). He then develops an analogy with another" autonomous
language," pure mathematics, which has a relation to the physical world like
that of literature to the world of experience.
The strengths of Mr. Frye's book are inseparable from what seem to be weaknesses. He looks at the whole body of literature with rare breadth of lmowledge
and imagination, and in his efforts to define and classify he expands our awareness
of the extent to which literary forms can be rationally and objectively described.
But the achievement inevitably involves the creation of large abstractions and
some deliberate simplifications. His book, and even his concept of criticism,
leads the critic farther and farther from the particular literary work, and from
the reading experience. One of his aims as a critic is to avoid the prejudices
of contemporary taste, which, he feels, have always distorted the views of critics
who set up as judges. One wonders whether his emphasis on "archetypal
criticism" is not itself a reflection of contemporary taste. The prominence of
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mythical elements in Joyce and Kafka suggests to him some kind of natural law
by which the last of his historical "modes" -the ironic-returns to the firstthe mythical. But these elements in Joyce and Kafka may only reflect the same
contemporary interests in psychology and anthropology which are reflected in
Mr. Frye's book.

University of Texas

ALEXANDER SACKTON

Tbe Flaming Heart by Mario Praz. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958.
Pp. 390. $1.25.
Professor Mario Praz in The Flaming Heart publishes a collection of essays
with a single theme-the literary relations between Italy and England from
Chaucer to the present. A general introduction is followed by a series of separate
essays, some centered on English authors-Chaucer, Shakespeare, Jonson, Donne,
Crashaw, and T. S. Eliot-and some on Italian-Machiavelli, Petrarch, Ariosto, and
Tasso. Dante has a prominent place, especially in the treatment of Chaucer and
T. S. Eliot, the hiatus between being felt by Mr. Praz to represent the course
of Dante's English reputation. Though most of these essays have made earlier
appearances, many now appear for the first time in English, and the one on
Petrarch, with a valuable survey of the continental origins of the sonnet, appears
for the first time. "An author's fortune," Professor Praz writes, "is not so
much measured by a tabulation of quotations, as by the impulse his work gives
to original creation, or else by the place he occupies in popular imagination as
a legendary figure" (p. 288). In these various ways, he feels, Italy contributed
to the establishment of an original literary tradition in England. Though many
lines of Chaucer, of course, are indebted to Boccaccio, Professor Praz believes
the influence of Dante is "more deeply interfused and widespread" (p. 78).
According to Mr. Praz the idea of the framework of the Canterbury Tales may
well have been suggested by Dante's pilgrimage on which he met people of all
classes; and if some of Chaucer's characters are historical we should remember
that the" idea: of mixing history and fiction is eminently Dante's idea" (p. 77).
The presence of Dante in his mind may be responsible for some of Mr. Praz's
strictures on Chaucer. As to his" displays of erudition," for example, in which
the modern reader detects irony, Professor Praz suggests that compared with
Dante and Petrarch Chaucer "fell into grotesque, parvenu-like crudity" (p. 59).
What we take for humor was often not so intended, Mr. Praz says.
The influence of Machiavelli in the Elizabethan drama seems to Professor Praz
mainly that of a legendary figure. Although Marlowe, Jonson, Chapman, and
Kyd clearly knew Machiavelli's work, Mr. Praz argues that they used it like
Cinthio in Italy only to bring the Senecan tyrants up to date (p. 116), and most
other Elizabethans merely exploit for sensational effect a fictional Machiavelli,
the product of political and religious prejudice. Although Professor Praz traces
this prejudice mainly to anti-Italian feeling in sixteenth century France, one may
wonder if it was not due also to the weight of the tradition in which the ruler
was studied in a moral not an amoral context.
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A different kind of influence is felt to be present in V olpol1e which Professor
Praz feels is "inspired "-in its writing, its atmosphere, and in Valpone himselfby Aretina (p. 182). A similar" spiritual affinity" is found between A Midsummer
Nigbt's Dream and Ariosto (p. 301). In observing the representation of a real
Italy by Shakespeare and Jonson in comparison with a fantastic one imagined
by other Elizabethans, Professor Praz may be observing not a more direct
influence, but only the superior imagination of Jonson and Shakespeare. From
books, and from men like John Florio, as Mr. Praz suggests, they were able to
imagine a real world, while most of their contemporaries merely repeated cliches
about Italy. But of course, the Elizabethans had no need or intention of reproducing local color realistically. Though he comes to sensible conclusions, Mr.
Praz devotes perhaps too many pages to irrelevant questions about the reality
of the Italian settings of Elizabethan drama. A striking illustration of Shakespeare's
imaginative use of Italian literature is his shaping of Romeo's speech from the
Petrarchan sonneteering tradition. Mr. Praz suggests he does this because Romeo
is an Italian, but it may well be only because he is a lover.
The major Italian influences came before 1700, after which the center of
European culture had completed its shift northward. In the period from Chaucer
to l\1ilton, and especially in the sixteenth century, lVir. Praz stresses the importance
of Italian literature in establishing a native English tradition. The sonnet, blank
verse, the Spenserian stanza, euphuistic prose, tragedy, comedy, the religious epic,
the Pindaric Ode-each begins in England with some Italian connection. Its
importance may vary and, especially for major authors, may be easily exaggerated,
but Professor Praz's survey is a valuable reminder of its pervasive presence before
1700.

The important essay on Crashaw appears in English for the first time, more
than thirty years after its original appearance. It finds in Crashaw the "quintessence of the seventeenth century," the literary counterpart of Reubens, Murillo
and El Greco, and of Baroque architecture. Professor Praz sees in these aspects
of the seventeenth century some decadent "exaggeration" of medieval attitudes
(p. 207), but one would have liked more discriminations between this" Baroque
sensibility," as Austin Warren calls it, and that of the more English Donne and
Herbert. One may feel that the cultural lag in England made it closer to
medieval tradition than Italy was in the seventeenth century.
The final essay, "T. S. Eliot and Dante," is an extension of one published in
1937. The subject is rich, and students should be grateful for this suggestive
introduction to it. Professor Praz emphasizes Eliot's debt to Pound for his
reading of Dante-a reading profoundly important to him both as poet and critic,
inseparable roles for him. The Italian reader, lVir. Praz suggests, finds Eliot's use
of Dante "curious." It seems "curious," for example, that Eliot should find
Dante's language simple and direct in comparison with Shakespeare's. But Mr.
Praz thinks that Eliot may be responding rather to the general qualities of the
Tuscan language than to Dante's special use of it. There is the implication that
Eliot's reading, as that of a foreigner, is limited, and yet Mr. Praz never denies
that the qualities Eliot finds in Dante are there. Both Pound and Eliot read
Dante" as if he were a contemporary poet" (Pound is quoted as saying), and
their reading may reflect not so much a foreign reading, as Mr. Praz implies,
as a modern one. What makes Eliot's reading and use of Dante seem "curious"
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to the Italian appears finally due to its being unexpected and untraditional. Mr.
Praz's main point is that Eliot's use of Dante is varied, imaginative, and subtle,
and he makes this clear. Though the subject of Eliot and Dante may be expected
to exercise future students more than any other in this book, there are many
details of our literary history that may well be reexamined in the light of Professor Praz's informed suggestions of broad and varied debts to continental
literary traditions.

University of Texas

ALEXANDER SACKTON

The Beautiful, The Sublime, and The Picturesque in Eighteentb-Century British
Aesthetic Theory by Walter John Hipple, Jr. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1957. Pp. 320. $7.00.
For those interested in literary criticism, this work on the eighteenth-century
beautiful, sublime, and picturesque is difficult, no less because it deals with
aesthetics, the philosophic foundations of criticism, than because its style is poor.
The theoretical assumptions and arguments, deductive and inductive, of the wellknown figures of eighteenth-century criticism from Joseph Addison to Archibald
Alison and Dugald Stewart and the writers on the picturesque, Gilpin, Knight,
Price, and Repton, are canvassed anew. Curiously, however, a first-rate original
and highly influential thinker like Hartley, as well as his disciple Priestley, is
practically unmentioned, while Blair, a second-rate derivative, is placed on the
same level of importance with others like Burke and Reynolds.
Literary criticism as such is not considered in this study: the critical implications for the arts are avoided. Just exactly what contributions to scholarship
Mr. Hipple has made in this survey cannot be easily assessed unless the reader
were to follow him patiently and carefully through his tortuous analyses of the
original texts. My impression is that many of the eighteenth-century treatises
(with the possible exception of the essay on tragedy by Hume, who is the only
really subtle philosopher of the period) are not half so complicated, dense and
difficult as they appear to be in Hipple's turgid prose. For example, Alison's
Essays on Taste, based on a simple induction, is most perspicuously written, a
work that has the typical lucidity of eighteenth-century good writing. But
Hipple's summary of Alison's contribution to aesthetic thought cannot be considered quite so simple and clear:
Hume, Gerard, and Alison had, of these writers, the most complete grasp
of the kind of logic appropriate to an analytic system, recognizing that
neither deduction from principles of human nature (whether these be
indemonstrable or established inductively) nor jnduction from the raw
data of taste is alone adequate for proof in aesthetics, wherein plurality
of causes and intermixture of effects abound. Both deductive and inductive inference must be used, and their consilience alone constitutes proof.
But since the powers ar~d sensibilities of human nature which enter into
aesthetic response are several, and their operations more than ordinarily
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subtle, the deductive process can not be pursued safely without some
view of the law towards which demonstration is to be directed; and
snch view is afforded by empirical generalization from the data of taste.
Here is the use of consensus: to suggest empirical laws which can serve
as hypotheses towards which the ratiocinative part of the process can
be oriented. The ratiocination is the principal part of the proof, and
that part from which the bulk of the doctrine will be evolved
(pp.316-317).

Hipple's thesis is simple, if his style is not. He reviews the whole aesthetic
system of each philosopher of the period, organizing the remarks on physical
and moral beauty and sublimity, standards of taste, and the picturesque. He
restates the argument and exposes the logical framework, his commentary largely
dealing with the logical consistency of the texts. !-lis method is often exceedingly
technical and sometimes needlessly obscure, especially when he refers to the
logic of John Stuart Mill as a measure of the logical structure of works written
in the eighteenth century. I should think that a logic with which these philosophers might have been familiar-perhaps one like the enormously popular
Logick (1725) of Isaac Watts-could have been used as a measure rather than
deliberately to commit an anachronism.
But the chief methodological defect of tlus ambitious study is its purism-that
is to say, its concern with aesthetics exclusive of the cultural history in which
theory operates and, for most of us, takes recognizable form. References, for
example, to the findings in a work like Beverly Sprague Allen's excellent Tides
in English Taste (1937) could have given substance to the highly abstract analyses.
It is as if the aesthetic systems that Hipple recreates are tightly closed, entirely
unaffected by the social and cultural climate and having no critical implications.
A comprehensive historical resume such as this ought to have been written in
accordance with a consistently maintained historical point of view.
Moreover, it may well be asked, what is the significance of the aesthetic systems
that are re-presented? Hipple does not supply an explicit answer to this question,
assuming that they have an intrinsic and autonomous value, irrespective of any
possible relationship with artistic practice. The reader may occasionally wonderas he does with the contemporary" new criticism "-if extra-aesthetic values do
not provide these abstruse theories with the charge that lends them human
significance.
Yet the a-historical method that Hipple has adopted does have one strong
virtue. Because the thinkers of the period are not regarded with the usual
preconceptions concerning eighteenth-century aesthetic trends, Hipple can see
them for what they are, or may really be, without reference to an assigned
position in the orthodox cultural histories. For such is Hipple's purpose: to
preserve the integrity of the philosophic text-to examine without refraction
through alien theories and on their own merits eighteenth-century theories of
beauty, the sublime, and the picturesque, and so to restore to them some measure
of philosophic respectability. Thus we may evaluate whole systems, rather than
the usual single parts extracted, simplified, and perhaps distorted, as in Samuel
Monk's classic work The Sublime (1935).
This novel approach leads Hipple to two interesting conclusions. One is that
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there is no clearly defined evolution of eighteenth-century thought on beauty and
sublimity. But, despite this negative conclusion, it is curious to see how Hipple
himself indicates how a synthesis does finally evolve in the eclectic aesthetics of
Dugald Stewart at the turn of the century.
Another conclusion, somewhat more significant, is that there is no neat
dichotomy between objective and subjective aesthetic views. It simply is not
true to see an increasing subjectivism in eighteenth-century aesthetics, Hipple
demonstrates again and again. A distinction such as this is an illusion without
meaning for these philosophers.
[Burke's] program is not, as some moderns have seen it, a step from
the objectivism of the neoclassic to a psychological and subjective view;
this whole dichotomy, applied to the aestheticians here examined, is an
illusion-all the aestheticians from Addison to Kant and onwards conceive
of the sublime as a feeling in the mind caused by certain properties in
external objects. The real differences among these men are to be sought
in the methods of argument and the causal principles which they employ
(p.84).
Hipple thus attempts to destroy what he believes is the false dialectic of neoclassicobjective vs. romantic-subjective.
It is a curiously perverse tendency among modem scholars to argue
that the philosophical critics of the eighteenth century, by tracing aesthetic
responses to their roots in passions, senses, faculties, and association,
subvert the neoclassical system of rules and absolutes, and thus open the
way for rampant subjectivism.... Setting aside the fiction of neoclassical
rules, arbitrary, absolute, and objective, it is apparent that each philosophical aesthetician of the century subscribed to the idea of a standard
of taste superior in authority to individual predilections; each supposed
himself to be placing the admitted standard on its just foundations. All
found the standard connected in one way or another with human nature,
a nature universal and in some sense fixed. The derivation of the standard
from human nature could, and did, take many courses (p. 119).
True, as it is extremely easy to demonstrate, the writers of this period have
grounded their theories on psychological pr.inciples derived from their understanding of human nature. Hence they have been identified with empiricism.
But it is also possible to consider all of them subjective because they are so
obviously concerned to explain the causes of "agreeable emotions," the emotions
of taste. Yet if the subjective-objective dialectic does not make sense, then surely
the neoclassic-romantic dialectic, or at least something like it, does. But Hipple,
pressing his own thesis hard, despite the fact he avers that he has no preconceived
thesis, ignores the data of cultural history and refuses to admit the possibility
of trends in critical theory as well as artistic practice. Perhaps, then, Hipple's
close examination of the texts signifies, as Rene Wellek and A. O. Lovejoy have
shown, that we have yet to be entirely accurate and logical in our sense of
classifying terminology and criteria for an intellectually satisfying understanding
of eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century literature.

N ortbern Illinois University

MARTIN KALLIeH
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Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques by George Knox.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957. Pp. xxiii + 1ll. $3.50.
Kenneth Burke's literature-oriented philosophy has been informed by an effort
so to manipulate diverse and antithetical terms as to uncover their ultimate principles of unity. Burke argues: "You can't properly put Marie Corelli and
Shakespeare apart until you have first put them together. First genus, then
differentia. The strategy in common is the genus." The concept of "strategy,"
by which Burke means one's manner of dealing with life, engenders difficulty
in the principle here stated, for one must go on to say that the strategy of writing
plays is not to be put apart from voting until these actions have been put together,
nor can one distinguish the urge to vote from procreative urges until these have
been put together. Moreover, Burke delays the synthetic statement by persistendy
seeing the intelligibility of any given action, A, in its otherness, its non~A significations. To his Hegelian metaphysic one can attribute his divergence from those
who reduce a work to the humane value of its content and from those who,
like the "Chicago Critics," initiate and explore critical systems to discover individuating principles of forms. Burke would neither construct a critique syncretically nor evaluate instrumentally; he would establish antithesis as a metaphysic.
What distinguishes him from the New Critics, whose method he approximates, is
his versatility and range of analogy and, more important, the fact that the usual
reductive principle of his critique-action-is very fruitful.
Unfortunately, it is a difficult task to explicate, as Mr. Knox intends, a system
which is a procession of syntheses. He realizes this (the" risky game" of placing
Burke), but he is zealous for Burke's reputation and would" establish a Burkean
semantics" for the II uninitiated" reader. With this task and this audience, Knox
chooses to define Burke's terms by "contextualization "; that is, in order to reveal
their proper meanings, he offers various contexts in which Burke used the terms.
At the same time he tries to trace Burke's development, from II tentativeness
toward systematic uncertainty." We need lmow further only Knox's concept of
the determinative whole of Burke's critique to understand his task and method.
Here we are left in some confusion. In his introduction and elsewhere,
Knox sees Burke as essentially a propaedeutic, heuristic critic. His grasp of
this aspect of the critic's work is revealed in his coherent, though because of
his method repetitious, sketch of Burke's procedures, which he provides in
the last three of the seven short chapters of his book. The first of these three
defines the Burkean "comic" attitude. Typically, Knox does not define the term
itself, but depends on our lmowledge of Burke (which makes his exposition
superfluous) or on our ability to infer its meaning from the discussion. A comic
attitude is that of an ambivalent, ironic, witty mind which tumbles words to see
if accidentally giving them new definitions or values will help them help us to
discover new perspectives on reality and art. This attitude prepares for ever new
syntheses by exploring ever new antitheses created by tenns thrown into the
depository of public knowledge.
"Pliant perspectives n are the product of such an attitude. In his sixth chapter
Knox suggests that the principle of this pliancy is Burke's awareness of how the
interests and preconceptions of the critic and the terms he uses interact to
determine what will be discovered in the matter being treated. One wishes that
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Knox had explained in terms of Burke's philosophical commitments why he tends
to be a "Coleridgean" critic (one who elaborates systems of terms to which he
adjusts poems) rather than an inductive critic of the "neo-Aristotelian" kind.
For it is not simply that Burke has the modern linguistic consciousness, an
analog of scientism, which treats words as though they were tools determining
mechanically the nature of the work done, although this is partially true. (Why
not, incidentally, "basic element" words-pity the critic who hasn't an adequate
supply; "catalyst" words to cause relationships among others; "litmus paper"
words to detect these relationships?) Nor is it sufficient to account for his
method pedagogically, as Knox does when he writes, that Burke
wants to be known as a 'student of strategies,' and would show his
detractors that his terms are perspectives. . . . He is always wor1cing up
some large program, such as 'dramatism,' which includes not only a
method for charting forces within a work but also a theory of personality
and sociality. Consequently, he has to go beyond purely exploratory
(heuristic) purposes.
This explanation is inadequate, for example, to account for Burke's "cluster
analysis" approach, which Knox outlines in his seventh chapter. For it is in
his practice of analyzing poems by isolating dusters of image-symbols that Burke's
dialectical preconceptions show their influence. An image in a poem is often
quietly itself but always noisily something else. Thus the" equations ))~patterns
of similar relationships among various images~Burke charts in a poem somehow
indicate transformation: the patterns discovered are, typically, polar otherness,
synecdochic otherness, ritualistic change of identity, surrogation. Again, the
heuristic principle does not clarify the subject-matter-form identification which
explains how Burke can discover the structure of an action simply by associating
images.
Nor does the pedagogical emphasis make Knox's own explication wholly
coherent, since by devoting four chapters to Burke's basic concepts before discussing his method, the latter is made to seem a consequence of the former. A
radical incoherence, then, mars the work and makes it, frequently, a series of
disjointed assertions.
The first four chapters, although they would make tortuous reading for the
uninitiated reader, survey Burke's important terms. The introduction outlines
his concept of a poem as an action which, like every practical or verbalized
action, occurs in some scene and is caused by some agent who is or uses an
agency for some purpose. Five ingredients compose Burke's basic "pentad."
Actions are verbalized in order, first, to utter or express the poet (psychoanalysis
and biography are important here); then to communicate (rhetorical considerations) j then to become consummated when the linguistic framework alters
(ritually transforms) the first two strategies and makes them serve itself, becoming
pure act.
Since all men are actors, there are universal forms or ways of acting~permanen
cies. Knox's first chapter outlines these basic forms, which can exist on three
levels: biological, personal-familial, and abstract-civic. AIl three levels interact: the
body and mind "posture" in parallel. (Thus, for example, an abstract argument
against socialism might be conveyed in a personally vindictive style using images
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of excretion.) The action of each poem symbolizes attitudes toward Of adjustments to life. Although the poet uses material proper to him, the basic adaptations
-for example, expiation, rejection, lamentation, purification-are universal. Farms
of acting in one sphere (say sexual rape) are analogously expressed in another
(say a political coup), and our grasp of the principle of unity in the diversity
of actions is due to the principle of "hierarchy" in our minds. Undergoing
transformation in the transcendent experience of synthesis-this is catharsis.

After giving us a catalog of the basic diverse forms, and a description, necessarily as indefinite as Burke's ovm, of "hierarchy," the principle of unity and
transcendence, Knox treats in his second chapter of Burke's concept of what
happens when basic forms of action become symbolized in the verbal gestures
of poems. For one thing, they are altered by the recalcitrance of the material
(a sonnet form distorts the original motive for writing the poem). Another such
factor is the inevitable human need to communicate (thus elements of appeal
enter into the activity). But, as Knox points out, these elements also transform
practical actions, so "we are still left with distinctions to be made between symbolic acts in the practical world and those of art."
Because the poem, an action of the author, activates the reader as well, the
form of the work can be seen as the way the author's act is reenacted by the
reader. In his third chapter, Knox sketches the ways by which poems progress
into shape: as an argument-syllogistic progression; as a gradual inducement to
accept certain qualities-qualitative progression; and so on. Nonetheless, we are
to grasp the form of the work, not first by detecting the author's needs behind
the symbolic gesture, or by detecting the pattern of emotional expectations and
satisfactions offered to the reader, but by investigating the" logic" of the whole
action. Again, one would \vish Knox had studied this "logic," which is the
dialectic.
Had he done so, perhaps the perceptive delineation, in his fourth chapter, of
Burke's struggle with the "intrinsic" nature of works would be explained rather
than described. What Knox observes is that Burke, in his practical criticism,
adjusts the reader's vision not by pointing to the work's whole structure, but by
creating a thick field of extrinsic data, usually biographical, from which, somehow,
the intrinsic figure is expected to stand out.
Burke's analogies and propositions, sometimes absurd, often honor reality in
being various and subtle; they respect many sciences by ingeniously employing
their discoveries. One could wish for any exposition of Burke now possible.
Unfortunately, in spite of Knox's evident familiarity with Burke's more persistent
words and statements, this work, because it is incoherent and often jargonistic,
is not a valuable piece of expository writing.
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